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ABSTRACT: In After Finitude as well as in Potentiality and Virtuality, Meillassoux conceives chance in 
a mathematical way. In The number and the Siren, he argues that Mallarmé had a philosophical 
conception of chance, specifically a dialectical one. Here we explore Meillassoux’s interpretation 
of Stéphane Mallarmé’s poem Un Coupe de dés. What we consider to be crucial about that 
interpretation is the Mallarmean concept of Chance, which we think is the precursor to 
Meillassoux’s concept of contingency. Additionally, we suggest that Meillassoux recuperates the 
Mallarmean “Perhaps”, which may called “Maybeing”, as that which replaces Being. We then 
explain what the concept of “Maybeing” is. Roughly speaking, it is a fusion of two English 
expressions: “may be” (modal verb) and “maybe” (adverb). Finally, we indicate how the concept 
of Maybeing can be used in order to solve the problem posed by the correlational circle, as well 
as some comments on Meillassoux's ideas about meaningless signs.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
If this was a work whose goal was to critically judge Meillassoux's interpretation 
of Mallarmés poem Un Coupe de Dés, then it would be necessary to compare 
Meillassoux's interpretation with those of others, particularly with scholars of 
Mallarmé. We would then determine which aspects of Meillassoux's 
interpretation can be said to be correct and which are not, and we would also 
have to point out what original elements he brings to the table. There have been 
critical examinations of Meillassoux’s interpretation of Mallarmé. For example, 
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on the issue of those aspects that Meillassoux's interpretation has missed, 
Wiedenfeld (2013) has pointed out that Meillassoux has not discussed the visual 
and graphic elements of the poem, such as the constellation that the words form 
at the end. 
Without questioning the pertinence of these kinds of criticisms, here we wish 
to explore a different topic. There is much to be said about Meillassoux’s 
interpretation of Mallarmé, but we will focus only on one aspect, albeit a 
fundamental one. We are referring to the way in which Meillassoux's innovative 
appropriation of Mallarmé is connected to the philosophical project that he has 
outlined in After Finitude. More specifically, we will see that Mallarmé’s concept of 
Chance is the precursor to Meillassoux’s concept of contingency. And we shall 
also see that this is so because the being of Chance, for Mallarmé, is something 
that according to Meillassoux has never been thought before. We suggest that this 
being of Chance, which is the Perhaps, and which is supposed to replace Being, 
can also be termed “Maybeing”, a term whose meaning we will explain later. 
2. CHANCE 
Meillassoux (2012) claims that 707 is the secret Number which is alluded to several 
times in Mallarmé’s poem. It is also the total number of words in the poem. 
However, Meillassoux says that what is important about the poem is not the fact 
that it has encrypted a special number. Hiding a number in a poem through a 
process of encryption is, according to Meillassoux, a rather puerile thing. He says 
that “a code, in itself, is basically something rather puerile, whatever its 
complexity”, so that if there is indeed a secret mathematical code encrypted in 
Mallarmé's poem, however complex it may be, we would have to explain why 
Mallarmé committed “the childish trick of a decipherment into the splendor of 
his fractured verse.” (Meillassoux, 2012: 10-12).  
In fact, many poets who lived at the same time as Mallarmé encrypted secret 
numbers in their poems, and Meillassoux (2012: 125-126) emphasizes this point 
when he says that “Mallarmé is not Sar Pélardan, and his gesture does not 
participate in that kitsch esotericism so widespread at the end of the nineteenth 
century.” Hence, “the code, in itself, has nothing singular about it: to count the 
words of his poem and to insert a charade that summarizes the ciphers, -anyone 
could do as much.” (Meillassoux, 2012: 162-164). 
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Thus, hiding a secret number within the poem is not the main goal of the 
Coup de dés. The importance of the number 707 is not the fact that Mallarmé hid 
it within the poem. On the contrary, Meillassoux argues that what is important 
about this number is that it symbolizes the concept of Chance. An obvious 
question can be asked at this point: why does 707, instead of any other number, 
symbolize Chance?  
Meillassoux's answer to this question is extensive. In fact, the majority of the 
pages of The Number and the Siren are dedicated to a detailed analysis of that 
problem. We will recount the answer here as briefly as possible. Meillassoux 
begins by arguing that the number 7 had a special meaning for Mallarmé. It is 
the number of stars in the constellation of the Septentrion, it is the seventh note 
of the musical scale, and most importantly, “for Mallarmé, 7 represents a medium 
term between the classical metric and pure chance” (Meillassoux, 2012: 45). It is 
also the number of words in the final sentence of the poem, which for Meillassoux 
is the “moral” of the story: “Toute Pensée émet un Coup de Dés.” He argues that 
this last statement is the “key” to understanding the entire poem. Before that 
sentence, the last word of the poem is “sacre” (sacred), and Meillassoux says that 
this last word must have an important relation to the number 7.  
So we know that the number 7 was important for Mallarmé due to several 
reasons, but this single digit cannot be, by itself, the secret number that Mallarmé 
encrypted in the poem. Because, according to Meillassoux (2012: 50) “he could 
not write the poem in 7 words”. It seems to us that Meillassoux's claim on this 
point is somewhat questionable. In principle, Mallarmé could have written a poem 
with only 7 words. However, we will not purse this line of objection here. 
After establishing the importance of the number 7, Meillassoux says that the 
total number of words in the poem must have some important relation to that 
number. Specifically, the total number of words must contain the number 7. This 
means that the final word of the poem, “sacre”, “will contain 7 in a significant 
way” (Meillassoux, 2012: 51).  
Then Meillassoux (2012: 51) says that the secret number must have three 
digits, no more, no less, since “there are, as a first approximation, many hundreds 
of words in the Coup de dés”. And the number 7 must be part of that three-digit 
number. One possibility is that the number be 777. In that case, the word “sacre” 
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must be the 777th word of the poem. To see if that is the case, the total number 
of words in the poem should be counted. But Meillassoux says that 777 is only 
one possibility among others. If the three-digit secret number has other digits 
besides 7, then there are many other possible candidates. For example, it could 
be 756, or 874, or 376, and so on. Again, the simplest way to find out which of 
these possibilities coincides with the total number of words in the poem is simply 
to count those words. Yet, this would not explain the meaning of the other two 
digits in that number. What this means is that the other two digits must also be 
important for Mallarmé, they cannot be any arbitrary digits whatsoever. 
What other digits were important for him? Apparently, the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 8, and 9 had no special meaning for Mallarmé. Meillassoux says that besides 
7, “the only other immediately significant number in Mallarmé's poetics seems 
to be 0” (Meillassoux, 2012: 51). Why? Because “it would be an obvious symbol 
of Nothingness or of the night upon whose ground the Septentrion appears” 
(Meillassoux, 2012: 51). If these are the only two digits that must figure in the total 
number of words in the poem, then in principle there are four possibilities: 777, 
700, 707 and 770. 
But Meillassoux also says that even if the total number of words in the poem 
coincided with one of those possibilities, it could be simply a coincidence. In order 
to prove that it is not a coincidence, but a deliberate procedure instead, it would 
be necessary “to discover in the text of the Coup de dés an encrypted allusion to 
one of these four numbers” (Meillassoux, 2012: 52). He argues that this can be 
discovered in the central page of the poem. His argumentation is extensive, so we 
will be brief here in recapitulating it. He says that the central page of the poem is 
where the whirlpool is described, and which is symbolized by the number 0. By 
comparison, the number 0 must be the central digit of the secret number, just like 
the whirlpool that it symbolizes occupies the central page of the poem. This rules 
out the numbers 777 and 770, and it leaves us with only two possibilities: 700, or 
707.  
Harman (2015: 133) has well summarized why the number is 707 and not 700, 
because:  “According to Meillassoux, the two occurrences of the phrase comme si 
(‘as if ’) in the poem should both be read as meaning ‘like 7’, referring to the first 
and last digits of the number 7-7.”, and after indicating the reasons for why the 
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middle digit is 0, he says “Both beginning and ending with 7, 707 ‘rhymes’ the 
number 7, or acts (in a Hegelian fashion) as the ‘negation of the negation of 7.” 
(Harman, 2015: 134). 
Here we will advance a series of remarks that seem to be implied by 
Meillassoux's interpretation of Mallarmé. The number 707, and not any other, 
symbolizes Chance because it is the product of a decision. What we mean by this 
is that, in principle, any other number can symbolize Chance, but Mallarmé 
opted for 707 due to his own personal reasons. His motives are many: the number 
of stars in the Septentrion, the seventh note on the musical scale, the Nothingness 
or night which is the background of the stars, etc. Someone else could choose a 
different number, for example 367, or 3532, or 145, etc. In that case, it seems to 
us that there is a series of Mallarmean requirements that the person in question 
would have to meet: 
1) The number which symbolizes Chance, chosen by the author, should be 
equal to number of words in the poem. For example, if the number that the 
author chooses is 563, then the poem should have 563 words. 
2) There should be at least one ambiguous term or word in the poem that 
makes the total count of words ambiguous. For example, a compound word 
which can be counted as a single word or two separate words. In our previous 
example, this could turn the total number of words into 564 instead of 563. 
3) The poem should provide clues that indicate which number has been 
encrypted. 
4) The secret number coded in the poem should be discoverable by chance 
alone, meaning that no amount of knowledge of the poet's background could 
permit one to infer which is the secret number that the poet chose. 
Thus, any number whatsoever can symbolize Chance in a Mallarmean way, 
provided that certain requirements are met. Mallarmé chose 707 for his own 
personal and aesthetic reasons, but one can choose another number for a 
different set of personal and aesthetic reasons. But whatever number is chosen, 
the poem should be sufficiently ambiguous to turn the total number of words a 
matter of uncertainty. And this is precisely why 707 or any other number can 
symbolize Chance, since 707 in Mallarmé's poem can be 705 or 706, depending 
on how the compound words are counted. The key compound word of the poem 
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is, of course, peut-être, "perhaps". It is no accident that Mallarmé chose this word; 
on the contrary, it was a deliberate decision, since it emphasizes the idea that the 
encrypted number may be 707 instead of actually being 707. Therefore, the secret 
number in that poem is and is not 707, it is what it is and at the same time it is 
what it is not. Perhaps it is 707, perhaps it is not. This contradiction is what 
characterizes Chance, since the Mallarmean Chance is contradictory according 
to Meillassoux (2012: 30). Already for the young Mallarmé, Chance was not 
mathematical, but dialectical instead, since it: 
“is credited with a power of contradiction (it 'contains the Absurd') that allows it to 
be what it is, as well as what it is not - and thus to be 'infinite' in the dialectical 
(rather than mathematical) sense: to contain always already what is beyond its limit, 
and to absorb that which tends to oppose it.” (Meillassoux, 2012: 30-31) 
But its dialectic is different from that of Hegel's Absolute Spirit. While Hegel's 
Absolute Spirit contains “all in itself, including that which appears to deny it”, 
Mallarmé's concept of Chance is “the process of Nothingness (understood as 
absence of Sense) including that which seems to be an exception to it.” 
(Meillassoux, 2012: 30-31) 
Yet, if Chance is understood as a lack of meaning, or Sense, then “that which 
seems to be an exception to it” must be meaningfulness, or Sense. This is why, in 
the example of a throw of dice, all of its results are meaningless. Even if that throw 
is made in the context of a game, and even if it turns out to be a winning throw, 
the result is still meaningless, though it could make the thrower think that “the 
course of things can seem oriented by an intentional and higher purpose” 
(Meillassoux, 2012: 30-31), while in reality there is no such intentional and higher 
purpose. It was just a lucky throw. Lucky indeed, but ultimately meaningless. 
The work of a poet, says Meillassoux, is governed by the same 
meaninglessness that is capable of absorbing and incorporating into itself even 
the most apparently sublime meaning, since “sometimes, a stupefying sonnet of 
great beauty seems imbued with a destinal necessity, as if produced by a higher 
finality” (Meillassoux, 2012: 30-31), while in reality no such higher finality exists. 
The most bland poem, as well as the the most sublime one, are equally 
meaningless, since both of them are governed by the meaninglessness of Chance: 
“it is always chance that governs and presides over the birth of geniuses and their 
productions” (Meillassoux, 2012: 30-31). 
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Meillassoux (2012: 222) says that the Coup de Dés crystallizes with a task for 
future generations, “As that which makes no longer being, but the perhaps, the first 
task – the task to come – of thinkers and poets.” 
3. MAYBEING 
If we asked, within the framework of Mallarmé's thought, or at least within the 
framework of Meillassoux's interpretation of it, "What is the Perhaps of an 
apple?” instead of asking "What is the being of an apple", the answer would have 
to be: “Perhaps the apple will become a tree, or Perhaps not.” We do not know if 
a certain apple will become a tree or not. If it falls to the ground and the seeds 
begin to turn into a new plant, then it may become a tree. But if it is thrown at 
the ocean, it will not. The task of future thinkers and poets is to thematize the 
Perhaps of the apple, as well as the Perhaps in general, as that which replaces 
Being. Yet it seems that Mallarmé would not have been inclined to consider that 
perhaps an apple can become a squid or anything else whatsoever, and especially 
without any reason to account for such a radical change. He would have said that 
any change is meaningless, however radical that change may be, but he would 
not have conceded that such radical changes can take place in our Universe. 
Because if he conceded this, then he would have had to abandon his concept of 
Chance. Why? 
Chance, Mallarmean or not, requires a certain degree of stability. Which is 
to say, Chance could not survive in a lawless, capricious universe. Let us be more 
precise. Chance is something that can be mathematized. If I throw a pair of dice, 
there are many equally possible results in principle. But if the dice turn into swans, 
I can no longer expect them to turn up a double six. This is why Meillassoux says 
the following in After Finitude: 
“Thus, it is important to notice that the very notion of chance is only conceivable 
on condition that there are unalterable physical laws. This is precisely what the 
example of the dice-throw shows: an aleatory sequence can only be generated on 
condition that the dice preserve their structure from one throw to the next, and 
that the laws allowing the throw to be carried out not change from one cast to the 
next. If from one throw to the next the dice imploded, or became flat or spherical, 
or if gravity ceased to operate and they flew off into the air, or on the contrary, 
were projected underground, etc., then there would be no aleatory sequence, and 
it would be impossible to establish a calculus of probabilities. Thus chance always 
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presupposes some form of physical invariance – far from permitting us to think the 
contingency of physical laws, chance itself is nothing other than a certain type of 
physical law – one that is ‘indeterministic’.” (Meillassoux, 2008: 99) 
The implications of Meillassoux’s remarks are clear: if chance “is only 
conceivable on condition that there are unalterable physical laws”, then 
Mallarmé’s concept of Chance is only conceivable on that condition. Thus, if 
Meillassoux is right, then the Mallarmean Chance must presuppose unalterable 
physical laws. And if this is so, then Mallarmé himself could not have conceded 
that perhaps an apple can turn into a squid without any reason whatsoever, 
because if he did, he would have to abandon the notion of unalterable physical 
laws. And if he had to abandon such a notion, he would also have to abandon his 
concept of Chance.  
The term “speculation” is sometimes used in a pejorative sense, especially 
when one speculates about what a person from another historical period would 
have said or done. The rejoinder is always something along these lines: “How do 
you know what X would have said or done? They could have said or done 
anything.” Our reply is this: sure, X could have said or done anything, but not 
without consequences. In Mallarmé’s case, if he had conceded that an entity can 
radically change for no reason whatsoever, this would have had profound 
consequences for his concept of Chance. Specifically, he would have had to 
abandon such a concept. Speculation in this sense is not a matter of advancing 
reckless claims that cannot be proved; on the contrary, it is a matter of showing 
that there were precise reasons for why X could not have said or done anything 
whatsoever without any sort of consequences. These consequences act as 
constrains for what X would have been willing to say or do; unless, of course, X 
was willing to embrace those consequences. And if they would have been willing 
to embrace those consequences, it must be explained why. Otherwise, there are 
no reasons for us to abandon our speculations about what X would have said or 
done, and what they would not have been willing to say or do. 
For those who feel uneasy about the term “speculation”, it can be translated 
into Popperian language: “speculation” here would mean the same thing as 
“conjecture”. Of course, Popper held that formulating conjectures is not enough, 
they must be submitted to rigorous trials in order to see if they can survive the 
attempts to refute them. In other words, they must be falsifiable without being 
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falsified, at least for the time being. But if a conjecture is not falsifiable, this does 
not mean that it is worthless. For Popper, this only means that the conjecture is 
metaphysical. But Popper was never of the opinion that metaphysics is worthless. 
On the contrary, he believed that metaphysics was a fruitful enterprise, even for 
the stimulation of scientific activity. He liked to cited the metaphysics of the 
Ancient atomists and the impact their metaphysics had on the development of 
physics. Thus, from a Popperian point of view, unfalsifiable conjectures, or 
speculations, are not worthless, at least not all of them (Popper, 1989; 2002). And 
if pointing out the role that certain speculations had in the development of science 
seems too restricted, it is enough to recall the role that speculations can have in 
the production of, for example, science fiction, and literature in general. 
Let us get back to Meillassoux’s interpretation of Mallarmé. Chance must be 
understood as requiring unalterable physical laws. This is the point of departure 
for the elaboration of Meillassoux’s concept of contingency. He explicitly states 
that “we must elaborate a concept of the contingency of laws that is fundamentally 
distinct from the concept of chance.” (Meillassoux, 2008: 100). 
The Mallarmean Chance requires unalterable physical laws, but if the task of 
thinkers and poets is to elaborate the Perhaps, then one may begin by abandoning 
the requirement just mentioned. This is precisely what Meillassoux has done. He 
has preserved the concept of the Mallarmean Perhaps without linking it to the 
concept of Chance, but to that of contingency instead. Let us pause for a moment 
in order to consider what this Perhaps implies. It is that which replaces Being. 
There are two colloquial terms in English which are synonyms of the term 
“perhaps”: the terms “maybe” and “may be”. For example: “Maybe John is 
dead”; and “It may be the case that John is dead”. The expressions “maybe” and 
“may be” are grammatically different. The first one, “maybe”, is an adverb. The 
second one, “may be”, is a modal verb. Thus, it would be grammatically incorrect 
to say “May be John is dead”, and it would also be incorrect to say “It maybe the 
case that John is dead”. We will make use of this duality in order to establish the 
meaning of a concept that we will call “maybeing”.  
In order to understand what the Mallarmean Perhaps implies, it is convenient 
to translate it into those colloquial expressions, “maybe” and “may be”, while also 
remembering that the Perhaps replaces Being. If this is so, then consider these 
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two questions: 
1) What is the being of an apple? 
2) What is the maybeing of an apple? 
The first question has the general form “What is the being of X?”, where “X” 
can be anything whatsoever. A more colloquial way in which that question can 
be phrased is: “What is X?”, or “What is an apple?”. In order to answer that 
question, we simply provide a definition: “An apple is a fruit with such and such 
characteristics”, or “X is a P with the characteristics Q1… Qn”.  
However, if we ask “What is the maybeing of an apple?”, matters are different. 
Here it is not clear what is being asked. So let us clarify it. Instead of asking “What 
is an apple”, we ask: “What may an apple be?”. Or, even more colloquially: “What 
can an apple be?” 
The question may seem initially perplexing due to its apparent banality. An 
apple cannot be anything other than an apple, if it is to satisfy the Principle of 
Identity. But apples do change. An apple can cease to be an apple, for if this were 
not the case, then it would continue to exist forever. But when we say that it can 
cease to be an apple, what we mean is that it can turn into something different, 
although not anything whatsoever. For example, bluntly speaking, an apple can 
turn into a tree, precisely because it has seeds from which the tree can grow. The 
edible parts of the fruit may be eaten by birds, or they may rot and become part 
of the organic substrate of the soil. And there are reasons for why this may occur. 
But an apple cannot turn into a squid. Because there are no reasons that would 
permit this kind of change to occur. However, contrary to Mallarmé, within the 
framework of Meillassoux’s philosophy an apple can certainly turn into a squid. 
It can turn into anything whatsoever, without reason. This hints at the maybeing 
of the apple, instead of its being. “What may an apple be?” Anything whatsoever. 
To state it less colloquially: “What is the maybeing of an apple?” It is absolute 
contingency. Even more so, the maybeing of every entity, thing, situation, 
process, etc., is the same: radical possibility without reason. 
We have been speaking of Being here in a rather unspecified way, but we 
know that throughout history different philosophers have understood Being in 
different ways. Thus, the way in which Hegel conceives Being is not the same as 
Heidegger’s. Instead of seeing this as a concern, we believe that it opens up novel 
possibilities instead. Consider what would happen to Hegel’s philosophy if Being 
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is replaced by Maybeing. In The Science of  Logic, first comes Being, then Nothing, 
and then Becoming. What would happen if Being is replaced by Maybeing in 
that logic? The answer is that Hegel’s system would be severely altered from 
within. He initially opposes pure Being to pure Nothing, but Maybeing is not 
necessarily opposed to Nothing. It may be opposed to it, it may be not. And this 
means that Maybeing and Nothing do not necessarily constitute Becoming. They 
may, they may not. Perhaps they do, perhaps they do not. The reader can see 
where this line of reasoning leads to: the complete implosion of Hegelian 
dialectics as we know it, only to be replaced by a system that, for an orthodox 
Hegelian, would look quite abhorrent.  
Now consider the case of Heidegger. Instead of viewing the Analytic of Dasein 
as a preliminary step for tackling the issue of Being, that Analytic would instead 
be a stepping stone for thinking about Maybeing. Furthermore, being-in-the-
world would be replaced by maybeing-in-the-world. Thus, the very core of 
Dasein would be brutally altered by such a replacement. And think of what would 
happen if we replaced being-toward-death by maybeing-toward-death. The 
result of all of this would be similar to Hegel’s case: we would witness the 
implosion of Heideggerian thought from within, only to be replaced by some 
repulsive, incomprehensible mockery which, nonetheless, might be just as 
profound as Heidegger’s thought, if not even more so. 
Lastly, to give a more accessible, but deeply disturbing example, that of 
Descartes. Recall his famous dictum: “I think, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum). 
Consider what would happen if we replaced that phrase with this one “I think, 
therefore I may be”. Why is this last formulation disturbing? Because if it is not 
necessary to be in order to think, then I cannot guarantee that I am, I can only 
entertain the possibility that I may be, though I may not be. In other words, the 
fact that I think would be insufficient to claim that I am; it would only give me 
grounds for claiming that I may be, although not necessarily, since if I may be, I 
may not be as well. And if I cannot prove that I am, solely on the fact that I think, 
then I cannot build the rest of the Cartesian system either. What I could do is 
build a very bizarre-looking philosophical building, where everything, including 
myself, may or may not be. Thankfully, this does have an upside to it. The evil 
genius may be, but he may not be. That the evil genius may be, is no longer a 
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sufficient reason for immersing myself in hyperbolic doubt. I may do this, but I 
may not. And both possibilities would be equally legitimate. Maybe I am being 
fooled by the evil genius, but maybe not. 
This procedure of replacing Being with Maybeing holds for any philosopher 
that has ever had anything to say about Being. This includes Parmenides, 
Aristotle, Saint Aquinas, Spinoza, Lebniz, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, 
Deleuze, Badiou, among others. In each case, the replacement of Being by 
Maybeing would make their philosophies implode, no matter if these were 
systematic or anti-systematic. But those philosophies, systematic and anti-
systematic alike, would be replaced by novel systems and anti-systems of 
philosophies. New books could be written, whose titles would be mockeries of 
already existing books: Maybeing and Time, instead of Heidegger’s Being and Time; 
Maybeing and Event, instead of Badiou’s Being and Event. Curiously, on this last point, 
Meillassoux has written an article on Badiou whose subtitle is The Event and the 
Perhaps, which, considering only titles, would be equivalent to Maybeing and Event.  
4. CONSEQUENCES OF MAYBEING FOR THE REFUTATION OF 
CORRELATIONISM 
Incidentally, it seems to us that the concept of Maybeing is what permits a 
decisive break with the correlational circle. This is so because the subject no 
longer attempts to think that which is outside of thought, but that which may be 
outside of thought. And something may be outside of thought precisely because 
it may be something radically different, which is to say: a certain object is 
currently relative to thought, but it may radically change in such a way that it is 
no longer relative to thought. The key word here is “may”, because the object may 
radically change, without actually doing so. The transformation, or change, that 
we are speaking about here is not one of radical physical transformation. We are 
not talking about, for example, a billiard ball that suddenly changes into a bird 
for no reason whatsoever. Here we are talking about a billiard ball that suddenly 
changes from being relative to thought to not being relative to thought. It is still 
a billiard ball. But the radical change that has taken place concerns the billiard 
ball’s relation to thought. Initially, it is dependent on thought, but then it changes 
in such a way that it is no longer dependent on thought. No physical change has 
occurred. 
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To express this idea in Meillassoux’s terms: in order to exit the correlational 
circle, I cannot think of something which is dependent on thought, and I cannot 
think of something which is independent of thought either. But I can think of 
something which may be independent of thought, even if it is not. In the first case, 
I am thinking of something dependent of thought, therefore I remain in the 
correlational circle. In the second case, I attempt to think about something 
independent of thought, but as soon as I attempt to do this, that “something” is 
being thought by me, therefore I remain in the correlational circle. Both cases 
are dependent on the notion of Being. But in the third case, I think about 
something that may be independent of thought, even if it actually isn’t. This third 
case is no longer dependent on the notion of Being, but that of Maybeing. I can 
think of something that, perhaps can be independent of thought. No contradiction 
arises here, and thus the correlational circle is broken. The contradiction can only 
arise if I am employing the notion of Being, but this is not the case when I employ 
the notion of Maybeing. In other words, the contradiction can only arise if I claim 
that a thing is independent of thought, but no contradiction arises if I claim that 
a thing may be independent of thought. In this last case, I am not claiming that 
something is independent of thought, only that it may be so, without actually being 
so.  
5. MEANINGLESS SIGNS 
How does all of this relate to what we said in the previous chapter about non-
Euclidean geometries, Hilbert’s formalism, axiomatic systems, and syntactic 
systems? The answer to this question resides in Meillassoux’s Berlin lecture of 
2012, where he discusses the ontology of the meaningless sign. Although he 
addresses several different topics in that lecture, Meillassoux’s fundamental thesis 
regarding formal languages is that, far from having no ontology whatsoever, all 
of them have an ontology. His line of argumentation begins by considering formal 
languages in general, including both mathematics and logic. This approach is 
different from After Finitude, not because it contradicts it, but because it elaborates 
it further. In After Finitude, Meillassoux was almost exclusively concerned with 
mathematics, whereas in his Berlin lecture, he gives attention to logic as well. He 
has subsumed both mathematics and logic under the scope of formal languages 
in general. 
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After stating that he will be considering formal languages in general, 
Meillassoux establishes a distinction between natural languages and formal 
languages. This distinction is based on the role that meaningless signs have in 
them. In natural languages, he says, meaningless signs occur at the level of 
morphology, that is, at the level of letters and syllables, which constitute words. 
We may say, for example, that the letter “T” is a meaningless sign. It is simply a 
visual mark or a sound that has no meaning in itself, but it is used in combination 
with other letters, as if they were building blocks, in order to formulate words. In 
general, words have a meaning, but Meillassoux notes that even in natural 
languages one can formulate meaningless words. The example he cites is 
Mallarmé’s term “ptyx”, a word which does not mean anything, but which plays 
an artistic role in his work. 
By contrast, in formal languages, Meillassoux says, meaningless signs occur 
at the level of syntax. In these languages, meaningless signs have a structural and 
fundamental role. The fact that Meillassoux is fully aware of the importance of 
syntax in formal languages is what justifies what we said in the previous chapter 
about syntactic systems. He is fully aware that these systems are composed of 
meaningless signs. And his constant references to mathematical formalism, 
specifically to Hilbert’s mathematical formalism, show that he is well aware that 
mathematical Platonism had been seriously questioned at the beginning of the 
20th Century, if not before. Thus, when Meillassoux discusses the importance of 
mathematics in After Finitude and in other texts, one must bear in mind that he is 
not a “naive Platonist” or anything of that sort. On the contrary, he knows that 
mathematical Platonism had been seriously called into question by the 
proponents of mathematical formalism. He acknowledges this in his Berlin 
lecture, and he states that his goal is, so to speak, to see if one can “move beyond” 
formalism. Specifically, he states that mathematical formalism, contrary to what 
Hilbert and other proponents claimed, does indeed have an ontology, although 
not a Platonic one. It is not an ontology of numbers which exist independently in 
another world, but an ontology of meaningless signs which can be produced in 
this world. 
Meillassoux says that what is unique and distinctive about formal languages 
is that they have a minimal condition, which is the production of meaningless 
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signs. We gave some examples of this in the previous chapter, when we discussed 
the clover-at-hashtag system. Meillassoux offers other examples, like 
“+++++++++”. This succession of addition symbols is meaningless. And not 
only that, it is even outside mathematics and logic. What we mean by this is that 
this succession of addition symbols would be a syntactic error in mathematics and 
in logic. In mathematics, one does not write “2 +++++++++ 2 = 4”, but “2 + 2 
= 4” instead. Likewise, in logic, an expression such as “+++++++++” has no 
place. So why does Meillassoux offer this example? Because, even though it 
would be incorrect to use it in mathematics and in logic, one can invent a new 
syntactic system where “+++++++++” is a well-formed formula, just like one 
can invent a new syntactic system, such as the clover-at-hashtag system, where 
“ �#” is a meaningless, well-formed formula. 
 So far, what has been said is that one can produce meaningless signs, and 
then use these meaningless signs as the building blocks of a syntactic system. By 
introducing certain restrictions, one can turn a syntactic system into a formal 
language, such as logic or mathematics. At this point, Meillassoux says that the 
ability to produce meaningless signs can be derived from the Principle of 
Factiality, which was introduced in After Finitude. There is a fundamental relation 
or “essential link”, he says, between meaningless signs and contingency, 
understanding the term “contingency” in the way in which it was defined in After 
Finitude.  
In order to understand this fundamental relation between meaningless signs 
and absolute contingency, it will be convenient to see what else Meillassoux has 
to say about meaningless signs. In his discussion, he uses the distinction, widely 
discussed in linguistics and in philosophy of language, between types and tokens. 
A token is the occurrence of a type. What this means is that an expression such 
as “+++++++++” is the repeated occurrence of a single type, the meaningless 
sign “+”. To use a metaphor, a type is like a Platonic Idea, and a token is like an 
“incarnation” of that Idea, something that “participates” in that Idea. But this 
metaphor is not entirely adequate, because Platonic Ideas supposedly inhabit 
another world, or another “realm”, whereas types are not floating around in some 
other world or realm; instead they are part of this world. And they are produced, 
by convention, when it is consented that a certain meaningless visual mark or 
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sound may be reproduced or repeated. When this is conceded, that visual mark 
or sound ceases to be just some arbitrary image or sound, and becomes instead a 
meaningless sign which bears a type/token distinction. That meaningless sign, 
qua visual mark or sound, is a token, but since we have agreed that we may repeat 
it or reproduce it, it is also a type; or more precisely, it is at the same time a token 
and an occurrence of a type. 
What does this have to do with the fundamental relation between meaningless 
signs and absolute contingency? To state it briefly, for Meillassoux there is a way 
of perceiving a meaningless sign which is at the same time the perception of 
absolute contingency. It is not immediately clear, however, what the preceding 
statement means. So let us clarify it. Meillassoux says that there are two ways in 
which a meaningless sign can be perceived. Before explaining what these two 
ways are, let us focus for a moment on something else that Meillassoux says about 
these two ways of perceiving: he says that one can switch between them. In order 
to understand this, we will use as an example what Kuhn (1970) says about visual 
figures such as the duck-rabbit.  
When I look at the image of the duck-rabbit, I can perceive it as a duck, or as 
a rabbit. In other words, I can switch between the perception of one of the 
animals and the other. In analogous fashion, when I see a meaningless sign 
marked on a piece of paper, I can perceive it as a visual mark. But I can also 
perceive it as an occurrence of a type. In analogous fashion, when I look at any 
entity that can be visually perceived, such as an apple, I can look at it in two ways: 
as a contingent thing, or as “a vehicle for contingency”. In other words, the duck-
rabbit is comparable to the apple-contingency. Or, to state it more generally, the 
duck-rabbit is comparable to the entity-contingency. I can switch between my 
perception of the duck and the perception of the rabbit in the duck-rabbit image. 
Likewise, I can switch between my perception of an entity and my perception of 
contingency in the entity-contingency compound, or the X-contingency 
compound, where X can be anything whatsoever: an entity, situation, fact, 
process, physical law, etc. 
Unlike the duck-rabbit image, the duality in the X-contingency compound 
cannot be visually perceived. I cannot “see” contingency. Nor can I hear it, taste 
it, smell it or touch it. It is not something that I can perceive through one of my 
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five senses. In the apple-contingency compound, I can perceive the apple with all 
of my senses: I can see its color, I can hear the sound that it makes when it falls 
to the ground, I can perceive its aroma, I can taste its sweetness, and I can feel its 
smooth, solid surface. None of this can be done with contingency. The only way 
in which I can “perceive” contingency is through thought. 
Of course, this idea of “perceiving” contingency is polemic. In After Finitude, 
Meillassoux (2008: 82-83) claims that contingency can be accessed by way of 
“intellectual intuition”. Kant had dismissed “intellectual intuition” in the Critique 
of  Pure Reason. Brassier (2007) argued extensively that this concept is problematic 
for Meillassoux’s philosophy, and that it should be abandoned. We agree with 
Brassier that Meillassoux attempts to rehabilitate intellectual intuition in a non-
Kantian way. So, for example, in his interview with Florian Hecker, one of the 
definitions of rationality that he advances is this one: “rationality is just the 
capacity to be directly connected to a hyperchaos which has absolutely no limits” 
(Meillassoux & Hecker, fecha: 4). This definition of rationality could well be a re-
definition of “intellectual intuition”. Yet, this re-definition does not convince us. 
Unless the concept of intellectual intuition is fleshed out even further, we agree 
with Kant and with Brassier on this point: humans do not have such a faculty. 
But we will leave this aside here. Let us continue with Meillassoux’s reflections on 
meaningless signs.  
He says that a meaningless sign is arbitrary. This means that anything can be 
used to replace it. For example, in the clover-at-hashtag system, there is no reason 
to use a clover sign instead of a diamond sign or any other meaningless sign. We 
can replace the clover sign with a diamond sign, and this will not alter the syntax 
of the system in any way. Meillassoux distinguishes the arbitrariness of the 
meaningless sign from the Saussurian concept of arbitrariness, which is a relation 
between the signifier and the signified. What the Saussurian concept of 
arbitrainess means is that any signifier can be used for the same signified, and 
that it is not necessary that a certain signifier be associated with a certain 
signified. For example, if the signified is “the fruit of an apple tree”, then it is not 
necessary that we use the signifier “apple” for that, it is only arbitrary. For if this 
were not the case, then the signifiers “pomme” and “manzana”, which are the 
French and Spanish terms for “apple”, could not be signifiers of the signified in 
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question. In contrast to the Saussurian concept of arbitrariness, the 
Meillassouxian concept of arbitrariness does not pertain to the relation between 
signifier and signified, but to a relation that is exclusive to signifiers. In other 
words, it is a relation between a meaningless sign and another meaningless sign. 
Any sensible mark, says Meillassoux, can fulfill the role of a meaningless sign, the 
syntactic role it has in a formal language. As an example, he says that the 
meaningless signs of formal set theory can be replaced by seashells. 
In our example of the clover-at-hashtag system, the � sign could be replaced 
by a rock, the # symbol by a seashell, and the @ symbol by a shoe. Recall that, 
according to the production rules of that system, from the formula ## we can 
obtain �. By making the replacements mentioned before, this means that if we 
place two rocks together, then we can place a seashell in the next step, but not a 
rock or a shoe. Why? Because those are the production rules that we had invented 
for that syntactic system. Any other rules could have been invented instead, for 
example, by stating that from ## we obtain @ instead of �. That these 
meaningless signs can be replaced by any other sensible marks, such as rocks, 
seashells and shoes, implies that they are arbitrary in the Meillassouxian, and not 
the Saussurian sense. And this is so because they have no meaning whatsoever. 
Which is to say, they have no semantic role, only a syntactic one. 
In sum, Meillassoux says that formal languages, understood as syntactic 
relations of meaningless signs, have an ontology. They have no Being in any of 
the traditional acceptances of this term, such as Aristotle’s, Hegel’s or Heidegger’s. 
What they have, instead, is speculative contingency, which is their sole eternal 
property. Here is where, we believe, the fusion between the meaninglessness of 
syntactic systems and the Mallarmean Perhaps takes place. Recall that the 
Perhaps was to replace Being. Meaningless signs have no Being, but a Perhaps 
instead. They have a Maybeing instead of a Being. Which means that they are 
not only meaningless, but also absolutely arbitrary. And when we say “absolutely 
arbitrary”, this is meant literally. The arbitrariness of the meaningless sign is 
absolute. A meaningless sign such as � does not have a Being, but a Maybeing, 
since it May-Be a rock instead, or a seashell, or anything else. Thus, we emphasize 
the distinction between the phrase “to be” and this other, awkward phrase: “to 
may be”.   
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Formalism, understood as the philosophy that upholds that mathematics is 
nothing but the manipulation of meaningless signs, is taken up by Meillassoux 
and endowed with a Mallarmean ontology, where the fundamental ontological 
property of meaningless signs is not Being, but Maybeing instead. A meaningless 
sign may be, but not necessarily. And it may be what it is now and what is has 
been up until now, but not necessarily, since it may be something different.  
For Meillassoux it is not the case that the Universe is, in the last instance, 
mathematical. On the contrary, mathematics is, in a certain way, “derivative”, 
because what the Universe is, in the last instance, is radical contingency. 
Mathematics qua mathematics depends on this radical contingency, and not the 
other way around. For if it was the other way around, then Meillassoux’s 
philosophy would be nearly identical to Max Tegmark’s (2008) Mathematical 
Universe Hypothesis, and this is not the case. Only absolute contingency is 
necessary, eternal and fundamental; everything else, including mathematics, is 
contingent, perishable and derivative. To state it poetically: numbers can be 
destroyed by hyper-Chaos. Algebraic structures can also be destroyed by it. It can 
create a Platonic realm of Ideas, and it can also create Tegmark’s Mathematical 
Universe. But it can also destroy them, without reason. Yet this way of speaking 
is poetical. What we are really talking about when speaking of hyper-Chaos is 
radical contingency. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The whole idea of "perceiving contingency", as if there was such a thing as 
"intellectual intuition" is highly questionable, as are other aspects of Meillassoux's 
philosophy. For example, his claim that mathematical formalism has an ontology 
sounds more like a work in progress than something which has been definitely 
proven. However, despite whatever major differences we have with Meillassoux's 
work, we still think it is one the most perplexing and entertaining philosophies of 
the twenty-first century.  
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